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 Abstract 
Although propositional models of associative learning are often referred to in the literature on 
evaluative conditioning (EC), it has not yet been stipulated clearly what propositional models 
of EC entail. The aim of this paper is to describe in more detail the assumptions of 
propositional models of EC. This includes a discussion of the core assumption that EC is 
mediated by propositions about stimulus relations, as well as assumptions about the processes 
via which those propositions are formed and influence liking. Based on this discussion, I put 
forward the Integrated Propositional Model that combines a number of these assumptions and 
discuss some of the predictions that can be derived from this model. The paper ends with a 
reflection on the limitations and strengths of propositional models of EC.  
Keywords: Evaluative conditioning; propositions; learning 
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 Propositional Models of Evaluative Conditioning 
 More than 40 years after Levey and Martin’s (1975) seminal paper, research on 
evaluative conditioning (EC) is still going strong. On the one hand, it is good to witness this 
level of interest because EC research has the potential to shed light on how stimulus pairings 
shape our likes and dislikes. On the other hand, it is disconcerting to see that after so many 
years, there is still much debate about when and how stimulus pairings change evaluations. 
For many years, progress in research on EC was hampered by uncertainty about the definition 
of EC. Initially, EC was often considered to be a mechanism that produces evaluative 
associations in memory. More recently, it has been argued that EC is best defined as an 
empirical phenomenon, namely as the impact of stimulus pairings on liking (De Houwer, 
2007). By separating the to-be-explained phenomenon from the explanatory mechanisms, the 
latter definition paved the way for a wider variety of ideas about the mechanisms that 
underlie EC effects. As is evidenced by the content of this special issue, theoretical diversity 
has increased substantially in the EC literature. But also this observation evokes mixed 
feelings. On the one hand, theoretical diversity leads to debates that stimulate new research 
and could thus lead to a better understanding of both moderators and mediators of EC. On the 
other hand, too much focus on mediating mechanisms continues to detract attention away 
from finally establishing practical guidelines on how EC can be deployed most effectively 
and efficiently in real life. 
 While acknowledging that EC research would benefit from an increased focus on the 
practical use of EC, within the context of this special issue, the current paper focuses on ideas 
about the mechanisms that mediate EC. More specifically, I try to clarify some of the 
assumptions that propositional models make about the nature of those mechanisms. The 
propositional models that are typically referred to in the EC literature (e.g., Mitchell, De 
Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009; De Houwer, 2009) were developed to account for associative 
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learning, that is, for the impact of stimulus pairings on behavior in general. They have their 
roots predominantly in research on human causal learning (e.g., De Houwer & Beckers, 
2002; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992) but have often been related also to EC (e.g., Corneille & 
Stahl, in press; Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010; Sweldens, 
Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2014). Surprisingly, however, a paper-length treaty of what 
propositional models of EC actually imply is still lacking. The current paper aims to advance 
the debate about propositional models as they apply to EC. I also put forward one instance of 
a propositional model that combines assumptions about different processing steps that are 
involved in EC effects. In doing so, I hope to eliminate some of the misunderstandings about 
the nature and implications of propositional models of EC that have surfaced in the literature 
and during many informal discussions with colleagues.  
 I will not, however, put forward a formalized model that can easily be falsified. 
Although there are advantages to having falsifiable formalized models, at least in current 
psychology, such models tend to oversimplify inherently complex psychological phenomena. 
This often results in an emphasis on moderators that are important primarily because they 
have the potential to falsify models while ignoring other moderators simply because the 
models have little to say about them. Moreover, because formalized models often have a 
protective belt of parameters that can be adjusted to rescue the model in the face of 
falsification (Lakatos, 1970), in reality most formalized psychological models are neither 
precise nor falsifiable when considering the class of all possible variants of the model. I 
therefore believe that there is merit in entertaining a different type of models that are more 
informal but that reveal new answers to old questions, that generate new questions and new 
predictions, and that point at new ways of influencing behavior. Propositional models of 
associative learning as I conceive of them belong to the second type. I see them as a class of 
(current and future) models that are defined by the core assumption that associative learning 
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is mediated by the formation of propositions. Postponing the formalization of this core idea 
allows one to appreciate more fully the wide range of processes that contribute to learning in 
general and EC in particular. Some might argue that it is more appropriate to refer to these 
ideas as a theoretical perspective or framework rather than as a theoretical model. Because it 
is not clear to me what criteria “true” models should meet, nor whether there are many ideas 
in psychology that “truly” deserve this label, I will not take a definite stance on this issue. I 
do hope to show, however, that the ideas underlying propositional models of EC – when 
understood correctly – can foster progress in EC research.  
Assumptions that Propositional Models Do and Do Not Make 
Core Assumption 
 The class of propositional models of EC encompasses all current and future models 
which postulate that stimulus pairings can influence liking only after a proposition has been 
formed about the relation between the stimuli. 1 A proposition about a stimulus relation is an 
informational unit that is defined in terms of its informational content: it is a mental 
representation that contains information about the nature of the relation between stimuli (e.g., 
A predicts B, A causes B, A co-occurs with B, …). Because there are many different ways in 
which stimuli can be related, different propositions can be formed about the same stimulus 
pair. For instance, the same pairing of stimulus A with stimulus B can lead to the proposition 
that A co-occurs with B, that A predicts B, or that A causes B (De Houwer, 2009). Which 
propositions are formed depends not only on the spatio-temporal properties of the stimulus 
relation (when and where stimuli occur in space and time) but also on other factors such as 
                                                 
1 In principle, it is also possible that the pairing of a neutral and a valenced stimulus leads to a proposition about 
the relation between the neutral stimulus and the evaluative response to the valenced stimulus (e.g., “when I see 
this stimulus, I always get a bad feeling”; see Gast & Rothermund, 2012). That is, the propositions that mediate 
EC might also involve information about evaluative responses. For reasons of simplicity, in this paper, I 
consider only propositions about stimulus relations. First, conceptually, it is sometimes difficult to make a 
distinction between what is a stimulus and what is a response. Second, theoretically, the assumptions and 
predictions of propositional models are most often unaffected by whether the mediating propositions involve 
information about evaluative responses.  
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the broader context (including instructions) and the background knowledge that people 
possess (Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2007). Many propositions encode more 
than mere spatio-temporal information (e.g., the proposition “A causes B” encodes also 
information about which stimulus has causal power). Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
propositions about stimulus relations can also encode only spatio-temporal information (e.g., 
A co-occurs with B) or only the fact that there is a relation (e.g., A is somehow related to B). 
All propositions, however, are statements about the world and therefore have a truth value in 
the philosophic sense. This means that each proposition has the potential to be true or untrue, 
even if its subjective or objective truth cannot be determined in actuality (e.g., even the 
statement “angels have wings” qualifies as a proposition). The fact that propositions have 
truth value allows for the operation of inferential processes by which truth value can be 
transferred or transformed from one proposition to another. 
 Propositions are fundamentally different from associations. Whereas propositions are 
defined in terms of their informational content, associations are representational structures 
that allow for activation to spread from one node to another. Although fundamentally 
different, propositions can be related to associations by looking at the informational content 
that associative structures can encode. On the one hand, a single association that links two 
nodes is very limited in its capacity to encode relational information (e.g., to encode the 
difference between “A causes B” and “A predicts B”; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003; Gentner, 
2016). Therefore, associative models according to which EC is mediated by the formation of 
simple associations are incompatible with propositional models: they cannot capture the 
relational information nor the truth value that define propositions. On the other hand, some 
have argued that more complex associative structures (e.g., parallel distributed networks of 
associations) can capture complex relational information (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006). If it is indeed the case that these networks can encode propositional content (i.e., 
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statements with a truth value that specify relational information) then these complex 
associative network models should not be contrasted with propositional models; in fact, they 
would qualify as instances of propositional models (De Houwer, 2014a). 2 
 Some have argued that because associative structures could in principle encode 
propositional content, the debate between association formation models and propositional 
models of EC is therefore without substance (e.g., Gawronski, Balas, & Hu, 2016). I disagree. 
Most current association formation models involve simple associative links that cannot 
encode propositional content (see Hofmann et al., 2010, for a review). Even the models that 
postulate the existence of more complex associative networks only hand-wave to the idea that 
those networks could encode propositions. In actuality, there is no associative network model 
that even comes close to simulating effects of relational information (e.g., Hummel & 
Holyoak, 2003) and there are good reasons for why this is the case (Hummel, 2010). This is 
probably why during the long reign of association formation models, proponents of those 
models rarely, if ever, initiated research on the role of relational information in associative 
learning (including EC): their models have nothing to say about this. Hence, until association 
formation models are developed that can deal in a satisfactory manner with the effects of 
relational information, propositional models should continue to be contrasted with association 
formation models. 
Other Assumptions 
 As I noted above, propositional models of EC are defined by the assumption that 
stimulus pairings result in a change in liking only if a proposition is formed about the relation 
                                                 
2 Although these type of associative network theories of propositional learning can have the benefit of being 
more formalized, they have the downside of being committed to a particular representational structure. 
Propositional models that are not committed to a representational structure have more degrees of freedom and 
thus have more flexibility and scope. Still, it seems easier to reach agreement about representational content and 
about the environmental events that influence this content than agreement on the representational structures in 
which this content is embedded (De Houwer & Moors, 2015). Too much focus on representational structure 
could thus be counterproductive. 
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between the stimuli. Different propositional models might, however, differ with regard to the 
assumptions they make about the way in which propositions are formed, the precise content 
of the mediating propositions, as well as the way in which propositions influence evaluative 
behavior. In this section, I discuss specific ideas that have been put forward about these 
additional components of propositional models.  
 Formation of propositions: From pairings to propositions about stimulus 
relations. It has been argued that the processes by which stimulus pairings lead to the 
formation of propositions are very similar to the processes by which humans solve problems 
(De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2009). Living organisms are confronted with an 
environment in which many stimuli (co-)vary in complex ways. Successfully navigating 
through such an environment requires the detection of certain but not all patterns of 
covariation. Responding to all covariation would lead to chaotic behavior. Instead, organisms 
need to detect those covariations that can help them optimize their behavior. This is why the 
task of adapting to covariation in the environment can be seen as a problem and why learning 
processes might have much in common with those underlying problem solving. In the 
remainder of this section, I highlight two commonalities that have important implications for 
research on EC.  
 First, just like other forms of problem solving, the formation of propositions about 
stimulus relations does not result from a mere passive registration of events in the world but 
from constructive processes that can deploy all the channels of information that organisms 
have at their disposal. This includes information that is available in memory, that is received 
from others via instructions, or that can be inferred from the observation of others or from 
directed interventions in the world. Hence, EC is not an inevitable consequence of stimulus 
pairings; it arises only when those pairings are constructed in a specific manner. Moreover, 
because all of these channels produce propositional knowledge, information gained from 
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different channels can easily be combined and used to infer new propositions.  
 Second, because problem solving is usually considered to be a non-automatic process, 
proponents of propositional models have typically also characterized the processes 
underlying proposition formation as non-automatic. More specifically, those processes are 
assumed to involve awareness (i.e., of the propositions that are produced) 3, time (i.e., the 
processes are slow), effort (i.e., they depend on mental resources), and the goal to learn (i.e., 
they depend on intention). Interestingly, although the evidence is not entirely conclusive, 
there is strong support for these ideas in the context of EC (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2010, and 
Corneille & Stahl, in press, for reviews). Note, however, that some instances of problem 
solving do seem to have at least some features of automaticity. For instance, solutions to 
problems can sometimes pop up quickly and almost effortlessly into one’s head. But even 
those instances of problem solving appear to be non-automatic in some respects (e.g., depend 
on awareness of the solution and the intention to solve the problem; see Moors, 2016, for an 
insightful discussion of why seemingly non-automatic processes can sometimes also have 
features of automaticity). Regardless of the existence or nature of automatic problem solving, 
from the perspective of propositional models, much can be gained by exploring the links 
between problem solving and EC. 4  
 The relational content of propositions. Although propositions can encode different 
types of relations, proponents of propositional models have until now said little about the 
variables that determine the relational content of propositions. One obvious factor is the 
presence of instructions about stimulus relations. For instance, when non-words and words 
                                                 
3 There is no reason to assume that the formation of propositions about stimulus relations requires awareness of 
the processes by which propositions are formed but one could argue that it requires awareness of the input (i.e., 
the stimuli that are paired) and the output of those processes (i.e., a proposition about how the stimuli are 
related).  
4 Some might argue that automatic instances of problem solving (and EC) are mediated by associative processes. 
Although it is difficult to exclude this possibility on an a priori basis, others have convincingly argued that 
automatic problem solving relies on automatic inferences that are performed on propositional representations 
(e.g., Sanborn & Chater, 2016).  
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are paired on a computer screen, some participants could be told that the non-word is a 
synonym of the word it is paired with whereas others could be told that the two are antonyms 
(e.g., Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2014). Also non-verbal cues can influence the 
content of propositions if those cues have previously been linked with specific types of 
relations (Hughes, 2012; Hughes et al., 2018). Finally, the nature of the stimuli is likely to 
constrain the way in which they are related. For instance, when pairing a word and a non-
word, the word might be interpreted as conveying the meaning of the non-word (especially 
when the experiment is described as a study on learning new words) whereas the same word 
might be interpreted as a personality trait when it is paired with a picture of an unknown 
person (especially when the experiment is said to be a study on person perception). Such 
effects arise because participants bring with them a wide range of propositions that were 
formed before the start of the experiment and that they deploy in order to make sense of the 
experimental situation. Making accurate and precise predictions regarding the relational 
content of propositions that result from pairings is difficult because there is such a diverse 
range of pre-existing knowledge that participants can bring to bear when confronted with 
stimulus pairings and so many contextual cues that could influence which knowledge they 
bring to bear. Nevertheless, propositional models enrich the literature on EC by highlighting 
the role of relational content in EC, as well as the impact that pre-existing knowledge and 
contextual factors can have by influencing the relational content of propositions.  
 Proponents of propositional models of EC also said little about whether and how 
differences in relational content lead to differences in the magnitude and direction of the 
changes in liking. This seems to imply that, in principle, any proposition that relates a neutral 
stimulus to a valenced stimulus could result in a change in liking. In an earlier paper (De 
Houwer, 2009), I did note that, compared to other types of associative learning, EC might 
depend more on propositions about stimulus co-occurrences (A co-occurs with B) than on 
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propositions about the predictive relation between stimuli (A predicts B). This proposal was 
based on the idea that evaluative responses are not emitted in order to prepare for the 
upcoming presentation of a stimulus, unlike to what is the case for many other responses that 
are studied in conditioning research (e.g., skin conductance responses). It is also in line with 
the observation that EC is relatively insensitive to manipulations that influence the predictive 
relation between stimuli (e.g., extinction). However, little research has been directed at 
verifying this proposal. In a recent paper, Hughes, Ye, Van Dessel, and De Houwer (in press) 
pointed out that different types of propositions could lead to different changes in liking 
depending on what attributions those propositions allow for. For instance, whereas the 
proposition that A causes B implies that A is responsible for the impact of B, the proposition 
that A predicts B does not allow one to attribute the presence of B to the presence of A 
(Heider, 1958). In support of the idea that attributional processes can be important in EC, 
Hughes et al. (in press) observed that the impact of the evaluative properties of B on the 
liking of A was bigger when the relation between A and B was said to be causal than when it 
was said to be merely predictive.  
 Impact of propositions on behavior: From propositions about stimulus relations to 
changes in liking. Because propositions have a truth value and therefore allow for the 
operation of non-automatic, rational inferential processes, it is often assumed that 
propositions can influence behavior (1) only via inferential processes and therefore (2) only in 
a non-automatic, rational manner. In this section, I point out that propositions can, in 
principle, influence liking not only via non-automatic, rational inferential processes but also 
via (1) automatic inferential processes and (2) automatic similarity-based retrieval processes.  
 Inferential processes are processes via which propositions are derived or validated on 
the basis of other propositions. They can operate in non-automatic ways, that is, only when 
awareness, time, effort, and intention are involved and in ways that meet rational normative 
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standards as put forward by philosophers. It might well be that some instances of EC involve 
non-automatic inferential processes that lead to normatively correct conclusions. However, 
even non-automatic inferential processes can lead to irrational conclusions and thus irrational 
behavior (e.g., when starting from incorrect premises or following normatively incorrect 
inference rules). Moreover, it is important to realize that inferential processes can also 
operate automatically to some degree. In fact, predictive coding models of human cognition 
(e.g., Metzinger & Wiese, 2017) are built on the assumption that human beings constantly 
make inferences automatically. 5 The effectiveness of popular behavioral techniques such as 
nudging (e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) also suggest that humans often base their decisions 
and behavior on quick-and-dirty reasoning. Drawing on these ideas, Van Dessel, Hughes, and 
De Houwer (2018) have recently specified a model of how (automatic) inferential processes 
might underlie the effects of (approach-avoid) actions on liking. When translating their ideas 
to the context of EC, the model implies that a proposition about a stimulus pairing (e.g., “A 
co-occurs with B”) can be combined with pre-existing propositions (e.g., that similar things 
tend to co-occur). This sets the stage for the evaluative inference that A (probably) has the 
same valence as B. In line with predictive coding models, Van Dessel et al. assume that these 
inferential processes can have features of automaticity. More specifically, both the validation 
of propositions (whether they are true or untrue) and the derivation of new propositions about 
stimulus valence can occur with little awareness of the underlying process, quickly, with little 
effort, or unintentionally. 6  
                                                 
5 An anonymous reviewer noted that predictive coding models are closely related to associative models in which 
the formation of associations depends on prediction error (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). However, this does 
not exclude the idea that predictive coding (and EC) can involve automatic inferences. Moreover, it has been 
argued that so-called “associative” prediction error models are nothing more than mathematical formalizations 
of inferential propositional processes that are not inherently associative in nature (i.e., they are situated at Marr’s 
computational level rather than algorithmic level of explanation; see Cheng, 1997, p. 370) or even incompatible 
with the spirit of associative models (Jozefowiez, in press). 
6 It would be interesting to compare the automaticity features of the problem solving processes via which 
propositions about novel stimulus relations are formed and the inferential processes via which those 
propositions influence evaluative responses and other behavior. It is likely that these processes have much in 
common. In fact, problem solving might necessarily involve inferences. Nevertheless, to avoid chaotic behavior, 
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 It is important to realize that propositions might also be operated upon by similarity-
based retrieval mechanisms. This possibility is often ignored because of a tendency to 
confound operating principles and mental representations (see Moors, 2014, for an excellent 
discussion). There is no reason why the content of representations (i.e., whether they contain 
relational information) would determine whether those representations can be retrieved from 
memory on the basis of similarity with the current environment. 7 In fact, one could easily 
imagine episodic memory models that are compatible with propositional models of EC (e.g., 
De Houwer, 1998; Stahl & Heycke, 2016). Episodic models (e.g., Hintzman, 1986; Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978; Schmidt, De Houwer, & Rothermund, 2016) postulate that each event is 
encoded in memory as a separate trace and that memory traces are activated on the basis of 
the similarity between the information stored in those memory traces and the subjective 
experience of the current situation. Because memory traces capture the subjective experience 
of each situation, they are likely to contain propositions, that is, information about the ways 
in which stimuli and responses are related in that situation (Schmidt et al., 2016). Hence, 
episodic models seem well suited to model how liking can be influenced by the similarity-
based retrieval of propositions.  
 Note, however, that episodic memory models currently do not take into account the 
                                                 
it could be advantageous for living organisms to put more restrictions on the detection of novel spatio-temporal 
relations (of which there are an infinite number in the environment) than on the combination of already available 
knowledge (which concerns only a subset of all information in the environment) especially when taking into 
account that inferential reasoning during retrieval can easily be shaped via reinforcement. This is why I tend to 
emphasize the non-automaticity of the formation of propositions about stimulus relations and the automaticity of 
inferential retrieval processes via which already available propositions influence liking and other behavior, 
being well aware of the fact that all processes possess a mix of features of (non-)automaticity that can vary over 
contexts (see Moors, 2016, for more details). Most importantly, I assume that, whereas the formation of a 
proposition requires awareness of its content, the retrieval of a proposition could well be achieved and influence 
liking in the absence of awareness of its content.  
7 The Associative and Propositional Evaluation (APE) model of Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006, 2014) is 
built on the distinction between two operating principles: similarity based-retrieval and validation. Although 
Gawronski and Bodenhausen correctly state that validation requires propositional representations, they 
incorrectly assume that similarity-based retrieval requires associative representations. This incorrect assumption 
is probably based on the idea that (1) similarity-based retrieval can be realized only via spreading of activation 
and (2) spreading of activation requires associative representations. If one allows for the possibility that 
similarity-based retrieval can also involve propositional representations, however, there is little reason left to 
insist on the presence of associative representations next to propositional representations within the APE model. 
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impact of (automatic and non-automatic) inferential processes on EC and are therefore 
unlikely to capture the full complexity of the mechanisms underlying EC. Also note that 
allowing for similarity-based retrieval leaves open the question of which propositions can 
influence liking via mere similarity-based retrieval. Once a proposition has been retrieved 
from memory on the basis of similarity with the current environment, that proposition could 
influence liking either indirectly (by influencing inferential processes) or directly (without 
any involvement of inferential processes). It seems reasonable to assume that, once a 
proposition has been formed about the valence of a stimulus (e.g., “A is good”), the mere 
presentation of A suffices to retrieve this evaluative proposition in a similarity-based manner, 
which in turn would suffice to influence evaluative responding to that stimulus without the 
involvement of inferential processes (but see Van Dessel et al., 2018, for the idea that 
inferential processes might also be involved in the impact of evaluative propositions on 
evaluative responses). On the other hand, similarity-based retrieval of propositions that relate 
a stimulus not with a summary valence (e.g., “A is good”) but with a valenced event (e.g., “A 
co-occurred with something good”) might have an impact on liking only after this proposition 
is combined with other propositions (e.g., “things that co-occur with good things tend to be 
good”) via (automatic) inferential processes. In sum, whereas it seems difficult to deny any 
role for similarity-based retrieval in propositional models of EC, different models could 
incorporate different assumptions about whether and when similarity-based retrieval of 
propositions is sufficient to influence liking. 
 One might argue that permitting similarity-based retrieval of propositions is undesirable 
for several reasons. First, it renders the class of propositional models virtually immune to 
falsification. In fact, a propositional model in which changes in liking can result from both 
(automatic) inferential processes and direct effects of similarity-based retrieval is effectively 
a dual-process model in that it incorporates two mechanisms via which propositions can lead 
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to EC effects. It thus falls prey to the same criticisms that have been directed at dual-process 
models in general (e.g., the fact that these models often lack clear assumptions about how the 
various processes interact; Mitchell et al., 2009; Moors, 2014). Second, allowing for 
similarity-based retrieval reduces the difference between propositional models and 
associative models (which also allow for similarity-based retrieval). It therefore removes 
some of the fuel for the debate between these two classes of models that has fired up EC 
research during the past decade. 
 In response to these concerns, it is important to point out that they relate only to 
propositional models that allow for direct effects of similarity-based retrieval of propositions. 
Propositional models that postulate only indirect effects of similarity-based retrieval would 
not qualify as dual-process retrieval models in the strict sense (i.e., all instances of EC would 
be mediated by inferential processes) and would be as fundamentally different form 
associative models than propositional models that do not incorporate similarity-based 
retrieval. In fact, for reasons of parsimony, there is merit in seeing how far one can get with 
single-process inferential models of EC according to which propositions about stimulus 
relations can influence liking only via inferential processes (e.g., a variant of the model put 
forward by Van Dessel et al., 2018). 
 Nevertheless, there is little point in dismissing offhand the possibility of direct effects 
of similarity-based retrieval of propositions simply because it makes it more difficult to 
falsify or differentiate between theoretical models. As noted in the introduction, there are 
downsides to focusing too much on falsification. Instead, theoretical models can be thought 
of as tools that help organize existing knowledge about the moderators of phenomena 
(heuristic value) and discover new moderators (predictive value) with the aim of increasing 
our capacity to influence those phenomena and the real life behaviors that are instances of 
those phenomena. There is merit in acknowledging that EC might be mediated by both 
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inferential and similarity-based retrieval processes because it raises interesting new questions 
about the conditions under which both types of processes result in EC effects. Even 
propositional models that allow for both these processes would still differ from associative 
models in so many ways (e.g., the non-automatic formation of propositions, the impact or 
relational content, instances of EC that are mediated by inferential processes) that there is 
enough fuel left to continue the debate between both types of models. 
Putting Things Together 
The Integrated Propositional Model of EC 
 Based on the considerations that were discussed above, it is possible to assemble one 
version of a propositional model of EC that I will refer to as the Integrated Propositional 
Model (IPM). It incorporates many of the ideas that were put forward in the first part of this 
paper and in earlier papers (e.g., De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2009) but is unique in that 
it integrates in a more explicit manner assumptions about the formation, storage, and retrieval 
of propositions and thus covers the overarching chain of processes via which stimulus 
pairings can result in changes of liking (De Houwer & Moors, 2015). 8 In doing so, it 
incorporates a number of choices that differentiate it from other possible propositional 
models of EC. Like all other possible propositional models of learning, however, it starts 
from the core idea that stimulus pairings can influence liking only if a representation is 
formed that contains information about the nature of the relation between stimuli. The 
formation of these propositions is assumed to be based on the same, largely non-automatic 
processes that underlie problem solving. Hence, propositions about stimulus relations can be 
formed not only on the basis of stimulus pairings, but also on the basis of instructions, 
observation, interventions, and inferential processes. The formation of propositions is thought 
                                                 
8 This is a revision of the model that I presented at the EC expert meeting in Ghent (Belgium) on 20 December 
2010. 
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to take place in working memory where input from external sources can be combined with 
input from long-term memory and other propositions that are already represented in working 
memory. Although the content of working memory is typically accessible to conscious 
awareness, working memory processes themselves can vary in terms of automaticity features 
(e.g., slow and effortful versus “quick-and-dirty” inferential reasoning). Once a proposition 
has been formed in working memory, this information can be stored in long-term memory. In 
line with the model of approach-avoidance effects that was put forward by Van Dessel et al. 
(2018), the IPM postulates that EC requires not only the formation of propositions about 
stimulus relations (e.g., “A co-occurs with B”) but also evaluative stimulus propositions (i.e., 
propositions about the evaluative features of stimuli; e.g., “A is good”). Evaluative responses 
to stimuli only reflect the content of evaluative propositions in working memory. Hence, 
propositions that relate stimuli to other objects (e.g., “A causes something good”, “A co-
occurs with something good”) can impact on liking only via (automatic or non-automatic) 
inferential processes that produce evaluative propositions (e.g., “A is good”; see Van Dessel 
et al., 2018, for more details). 9 Once an evaluative proposition has been formed and stored in 
memory, additional inferential processes can be side-stepped by similarity-based retrieval of 
                                                 
9 As noted above, other propositional models might allow for direct effects of propositions about stimulus 
relations (i.e., without requiring inferential processes via which evaluative propositions are formed). The IPM 
does not allow this route for reasons of parsimony. If it would have permitted this route, additional assumptions 
would have been needed about when which route operates (see De Houwer, 2014b, for similar arguments in 
favor of single-learning-process propositional models as compared to dual-learning-process models). Unlike 
other models (e.g., Van Dessel et al., 2018), the IPM does permit an impact of evaluative propositions on 
evaluative responses that is not based on inferences. This choice is based on the idea that one would need to 
stretch the concept of an inference in order to conceive of ways in which concrete evaluative responses can be 
inferred from evaluative propositions. For instance, it is difficult to see how increased activity of the corrugator 
muscle can be inferred from the proposition that something is bad in our definition of an inference as the 
process of reaching a conclusion on the basis of premises. One could, however, define an inference more 
broadly, as the probabilistic activation (or prediction) of information on the basis of  other information  (Van 
Dessel et al., 2018) such that muscle activity might be seen as an (active) inference on the basis of prior 
information about one’s typical response to negative stimuli (see also Friston, 2010). I believe, however, that the 
question of how mental representations influence behavior is a complex one that is currently not addressed in a 
satisfactory manner by either propositional or associative models (see Bouton, 2016, pp. 187-190). Although the 
choices made in the IPM can thus be justified, I put more value in highlighting theoretical questions as 
potentially interesting than in opting on an a priori basis for one answer to those questions. Whereas the latter 
might promote falsification, the former is more likely to facilitate progress in understanding psychological 
phenomena.  
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evaluative propositions from long-term memory. Figure 1 provides a graphic illustration of 
the IPM.  
 
 
 Although it is impossible to discuss all details of the model within the confines of this 
article (see Van Dessel et al., 2018, for a highly similar model), I will try to make the model a 
bit more concrete by considering the case in which a neutral picture of an unknown person is 
repeatedly paired with a pleasant picture of beautiful landscape. These stimulus pairings can, 
under certain conditions (see Van Dessel et al., 2018), lead to the proposition that the picture 
of the person and the picture of the landscape co-occur. In line with the ideas of Van Dessel 
et al. (2018), this proposition can be combined with the pre-existing proposition in memory 
that stimuli that co-occur in space and time typically also have other things in common, 
Figure 1. The Integrated Propositional Model. Pairings, instructions given by others, the 
observation of others, and the outcome of interventions in the world by the organism 
(jointly) lead to the formation of propositions about stimulus relations in working 
memory. New propositions can also be inferred from other currently entertained 
propositions (large grey arrow) as well as propositions that are retrieved from memory via 
automatic or non-automatic retrieval processes. Propositions are automatically stored in 
memory as episodic memory traces, although non-automatic processes such as rehearsal 
and elaboration can also influence memory storage. Evaluative propositions (propositions 
about evaluative stimulus properties) that are entertained in working memory can 
influence liking via both automatic and non-automatic processes.  
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including their valence. As a result, participants can infer that the person has the same 
valence as the landscape and thus construct the evaluative proposition that the person is good. 
Such inferences can be made in a careful, deliberative manner (e.g., when participants have 
ample time and resources to form an opinion of the novel person and have nothing else to go 
on other than the fact that the person and landscape co-occur) but might also be made in a 
more automatic manner (e.g., when participants reason in a “quick-and-dirty” manner 
because of a lack of time, resources, or motivation; see Van Dessel et al., 2018, for more 
details). Evaluative propositions cannot only be constructed on the spot via inferential 
processes but can also be retrieved from long-term memory via similarity-based processes. 
Liking will be based on the evaluative propositions that are entertained in working-memory 
(see Footnote 9). 
Heuristic and Predictive Value of the IPM 
 Impact of Relational Information. The IPM, as well as all other propositional models, 
predicts that EC can be influenced by variables that entail information about the nature of the 
relation between stimuli (e.g., instructions; contextual cues). This prediction lies at the core 
of all propositional models of EC because the only way to explain the impact of relational 
information on EC is to assume that EC is mediated by representations that specify the nature 
of the stimulus relation. In recent years, many studies have shown that relational information 
can influence EC effects (e.g., Moran & Bar-Anan, 2013; Hu, Gawronski, & Balas, 2017; 
Zanon et al., 2014), thus supporting the idea that propositional representations do contribute 
to EC effects.  
 It is important to note, however, that the IPM and other propositional models are not 
necessarily contradicted by a lack of impact of relational information (e.g., a less than 
maximal impact of the instruction that stimuli are antonyms; Zanon et al., 2014). On the one 
hand, there are theoretically uninteresting reasons such as a lack of power or a partially 
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unsuccessful manipulation of relational information. On the other hand, as noted already by 
De Houwer (2009), it is also important to remember that a person can simultaneously 
entertain several propositions about a stimulus relation (e.g., “A co-occurs with B”, “A is an 
antonym of B”; e.g., Zanon et al., 2014). Likewise, different persons can form different 
propositions after experiences of the same pairings. Hence, a less than maximal impact of 
relational information on EC could result from the fact that the observed changes in liking are 
(to some extent) mediated by propositions that do not encode certain types of relational 
information (e.g. “A co-occurs with B”). Note that for the same reasons, evidence for a 
unique impact of actual stimulus co-occurrences independent of the impact of relational 
information (see Moran, Bar-Anan, & Nosek, 2016), would also not refute the IPM or other 
propositional models. Stimulus co-occurrences can lead to the proposition that the stimuli co-
occur, which might influence liking on top of the impact of other propositions that do specify 
the nature of the relation in more detail (e.g., A is opposite to B). In other words, multiple 
propositions could simultaneously bias EC effects. These assumptions do not make the IPM 
unfalsifiable but increase its power to make novel, testable predictions. For instance, 
variables that selectively influence the evaluative implications of certain propositions (e.g., 
that undermine the assumption that co-occurring stimuli have the same valence; see Van 
Dessel et al., 2018) should have selective effects on EC (e.g., increase the probability of 
reversed EC effects when stimuli are said to be opposite).  
 Impact of Instructions, Observation, Interventions, and Inferences. The IPM 
postulates that the formation of propositions has much in common with problem solving. The 
IPM therefore predicts that (1) even in the absence of pairings, other sources of information 
might also lead to changes in liking, (2) those changes in liking resemble EC to the extent 
that the other sources convey the same information as actual stimulus pairings, and (3) the 
impact of one source of information can depend heavily on the information provided via 
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other sources. 
 Regarding the first prediction, it has now been established that mere instructions about 
stimulus pairings (e.g., “A will be paired with B”) do indeed result in changes in liking (e.g., 
Gast & De Houwer, 2013; Hütter & De Houwer, 2017). Second, there are many similarities 
between EC and the effects of instructions about stimulus pairings. Just like actual stimulus 
pairings, pairing-instructions have an impact not only on explicit but also implicit (i.e., 
automatic) evaluations as captured by tasks such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; e.g., 
Gast & De Houwer, 2013). Likewise, EC studies on extinction and contingency suggest that 
co-occurrences of stimuli have a bigger impact than stimuli presented on their own, 
irrespective of whether those events are experienced or merely instructed (e.g., Gast & De 
Houwer, 2013). Moreover, studies by Kurdi and Banaji (2017) suggest that pairing-
instructions and actual pairings produce the same magnitude of changes in liking. In fact, in 
those studies, combining instructions about stimulus pairings with actual stimulus pairings 
did not result in a stronger effect than the instructions alone. From the perspective of the IPM, 
these findings are to be expected when instructions provide the same information about 
stimulus relations as experiencing actual stimulus pairings. Nevertheless, the IPM does allow 
for dissociations between the effects of different sources of information simply because the 
content of the information provided by each source can differ. For instance, the actual 
experience of events is typically richer than what can be expressed in words. One should, 
however, be able to reduce these differences by super-charging the instructions with 
information that is otherwise uniquely available in experience (e.g., by describing the stimuli 
more vividly or asking participants to engage in mental imagery). 
 With regard to the third prediction (interactions between different sources of 
information), research on the impact of verbal relational information on EC (e.g., Moran & 
Bar-Anan, 2013; Zanon et al., 2014) already shows that verbal instructions can moderate the 
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impact of stimulus pairings on liking. In a similar vein, a study reported by Gast and De 
Houwer (2013, Experiment 2b) demonstrates that changes in liking that are produced by 
actual pairings can be reduced by giving counterconditioning instructions (i.e., telling 
participants that the stimulus that was previously paired with a positive stimulus will now be 
paired with a negative stimulus and vice versa). Although much more research is needed on 
interactions between the effects of stimulus pairings and the effects of other sources of 
information on liking, the results of Gast and De Houwer thus suggest that these interactions 
can be very powerful.  
 EC can have features of non-automaticity. The assumption that the formation of 
propositions is similar to problem solving has implications not only for the type of events that 
influence changes in liking (pairings, instructions, …) but also for the conditions under which 
stimulus pairings influence liking. More specifically, it implies that most instances of EC 
occur only after people become aware of the stimulus pairings, when people have ample time 
and resources to process information, and when they have the goal to learn. As noted above, 
there is strong evidence to support these assumptions (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2010, and 
Corneille & Stahl, in press, for reviews).  
 EC can have features of automaticity. Although the IPM implies that most instances 
of EC have features of non-automaticity, it also allows for the possibility that some instances 
of EC have features of automaticity. First of all, just like problem solving can sometimes be 
fast and effortless, propositions about stimulus relations might sometimes be formed quickly 
and with little effort. According to the IPM, however, EC can arise only after a conscious 
proposition of the stimulus relation has been formed. Second, once such a proposition has 
been formed, it can influence liking automatically via automatic inferential processes that 
result in the formation of evaluative propositions. Evaluative propositions that have been 
stored in long-term memory can influence liking also directly via similarity-based retrieval. 
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 Based on the latter two assumptions, the IPM predicts that stimulus pairings, 
instructions about stimulus pairings, and instructions about evaluative stimulus properties can 
influence implicit evaluations. It also allows the IPM to account for instances of EC in which 
participants no longer consciously remember propositions about stimulus pairings and, 
relatedly, memory-independent EC effects as captured by multinomial processing tree models 
(see Hütter & De Houwer, 2017, for more details). Finally, because propositions can have 
automatic effects on liking, it is possible that some EC effects are difficult to control 
(Gawronski, Balas, & Creighton, 2014). It is important to note that all of these predictions 
simply follow from what is known about inferential reasoning and memory retrieval in 
general. Although the IPM does not contain a fully developed theory of inferential reasoning 
or memory, it implies that the properties of inferential reasoning and memory retrieval in 
general will apply also to EC. Hence, these are not post-hoc assumptions. Moreover, they 
provide the basis for generating new predictions. For instance, the IPM predicts that one 
should be able to find evidence for the involvement of propositional representations or 
inferential processes in instances of automatic EC. As noted above, this prediction can be 
tested by manipulating variables that entail relational information (e.g., Zanon et al., 2014), 
by examining whether mere instructions about stimulus pairings lead to the same automatic 
effects as actual pairings (see Hütter & De Houwer, 2017, for an example of this approach), 
or by testing whether variables that moderate the output of inferential processes also 
moderate EC (e.g., a person’s assumptions about whether stimuli that co-occur have the same 
valence; see Van Dessel et al., 2018). This again illustrates the predictive value of the IPM 
and the way it differs from other models of EC. 
 Dissociations between different instances of EC. Because different instances of EC 
can involve (a) different ways of forming propositions, (b) propositions about different 
aspects of a stimulus relation, and (c) different retrieval processes, the IPM predicts that 
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dissociations can be found between different instances of EC. Above, I already hinted at the 
fact that different instances of EC might be differentially sensitive to relational information, 
depending on which propositions mediate EC (e.g., A is somehow related to B vs A is a 
synonym of B). Dissociations between instances of EC can also arise because they involve 
different retrieval processes. Consider instances of conditioned changes in implicit 
(automatic) liking (e.g., IAT scores). Within the IPM, these changes are mediated by 
automatic retrieval processes that are difficult to control. Hence, stimulus pairings can 
influence implicit liking even when participants have the intention to ignore them. Changes in 
explicit liking, on the other hand, are often based on non-automatic inferential processes 
(although they could sometimes be based also on automatic processes, as is the case when 
people rely on their gut feelings to determine their conscious opinions; Gawronski et al., 
2016). Hence, the IPM is compatible with the observation that efforts to control EC have a 
bigger impact on explicit than on implicit liking (e.g., Gawronski et al., 2014). Although 
other models can also account for these results (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), 
again note that the IPM uniquely predicts that dissociations like these would arise even if the 
(implicit and explicit) changes in liking are based only on instructions in the absence of any 
stimulus pairings (see Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, Smith, & De Schryver, 2016, for related 
evidence in the context of approach-avoid learning research). This again illustrates the 
predictive value of the IPM. 
Concluding Thoughts about the Limitations and Strengths of Propositional Models 
 Despite my efforts to clarify some of the assumptions of propositional models of EC in 
general and the IPM specifically, it will remain difficult if not impossible to refute these 
models. Consider the core assumption that EC is mediated by the formation of propositions 
about stimulus relations. It is likely that any empirical finding that questions this core 
assumption can be accommodated by adding or changing assumptions about the content of 
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the mediating propositions or the processes that create and operate on those representations 
(De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013).  As I noted in the introduction, this 
problem is not unique to the class of propositional models but applies also to the class of 
association formation models (Miller & Escobar, 2001) and other classes of cognitive 
theories (Barsalou, 1990). Also individual association formation models are often difficult to 
disprove because researchers tend to rescue their pet model from falsification by changing it 
in a post-hoc manner. The difficulty to refute models should, however, not stop us from using 
them. Even when they cannot be refuted, they can still allow researchers to conceptualize 
existing empirical knowledge (i.e., they have heuristic value) or to formulate new predictions 
and thus discover new empirical facts (i.e., they have predictive value). There can be little 
doubt that propositional models of EC have considerable heuristic and predictive value (e.g., 
Corneille & Stahl, in press; Hofmann et al., 2010).  
 Despite their proven predictive value, the capacity of propositional models to specify 
exact predictions is still constrained by a lack of detail. Without specific assumptions about 
how propositions are formed, the variables that determine the relational content of the 
propositions, the link between relational content and changes in liking, the nature of 
inferential and similarity-based retrieval processes, and the interactions between these factors, 
it will remain difficult to generate specific predictions for specific situations. Having said 
this, the current lack of detail is understandable in light of the complexity and multitude of 
the processes that, according to propositional models, are involved in EC. A fully detailed 
propositional model of EC would encompass a detailed model of problem solving, 
attribution, relational processing, memory retrieval, inferences, and liking. In other words, it 
would require an almost perfect understanding of human cognition and behavior. 10 
                                                 
10 The conclusion that EC depends on all these processes might be disconcerting for those who hoped to find a 
simple, non-cognitive learning mechanism underlying EC. They might even wonder whether there is any reason 
for focusing on EC if the processes underlying it are essentially the same as those involved in other well-known 
phenomena such as persuasion. For me, the true merit of EC research lies in the unique source of liking that it 
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Nevertheless, by highlighting the wide range of processes that are important for EC, 
propositional models orient EC researchers toward the existing literature on these different 
processes (also see Boddez, De Houwer, & Beckers, 2017). Propositional models therefore 
entail the promise that by learning more about these processes, we can learn more about EC 
(and vice versa). As such, they reveal potential links between EC and many other 
psychological phenomena that involve similar processes. It is this orienting function of 
propositional models that might well turn out to be their main strength.  
 
 
  
  
                                                 
focusses on: spatio-temporal pairings of events. Although the mechanisms via which pairings and persuasive 
messages influence liking might be fundamentally the same, the difference in the events that set these 
mechanisms in motion could have important theoretical and practical implications (see De Houwer & Hughes, 
2016, for a more detailed discussion). To further our understanding of how our likes and dislikes come about, 
these complexities should be embraced rather than discounted. 
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